Logistics and Mobility: The Backbone of Military Success
By exploring the history of military logistics, from Napoleon and the Cold War to present day, and zooming in on the challenges specific to the Black Sea area, this article highlights not only the importance of logistics and military mobility for the defence of the NATO treaty area, but also identifies areas of improvement to ensure optimal support for the warfighters.
This article first appeared in “Pledging for a free and open Black Sea” published by the New Strategy Center in Bucharest, Romania. and mobility
Introduction
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Western politicians tumbled over each other to collect the peace dividend. Spending on Europe’s collective defence was sharply reduced and stocks of weapons and ammunition were destroyed. After all, there would never be war on the European continent again. The conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s were dismissed as the last eruptions of the Cold War.
Russia’s attack on Georgia in 2008 was largely ignored by world politics. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 did prompt a reaction from NATO, but unfortunately it was very subdued and got stuck in pious declarations about the 2% pledge. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the wake-up call the West needed to take its defence seriously again. Overnight, the demand for weapons and ammunition in the West increased exponentially, both to rebuild its own armed forces and to provide support to Ukraine.
One of the logical consequences of the reduction in defence budgets was that the defence industry was significantly downsized. Forging swords into ploughshares is a beautiful Biblical concept, but one that has proven difficult to put into practice. As a result, there is currently a significant shortage of production capacity in the field of weapons and, even more so, a shortage of ammunition that the weapons need to (be able to) fire.
However, the availability of weapons, ammunition and tens of thousands of other consumables an army needs is only one of the challenges. All those weapons, ammunition, tanks, armoured cars, trucks, radios, and most importantly, soldiers, must be available in the right place at the right time in case of emergency. This requires careful, detailed planning, far-reaching flexibility in implementation, and the availability of both people and resources to execute that logistical operation.
Logistics in the military world encompasses much more than the narrow concept of “storage and transport” as used in the civilian world. The NATO Allied Joint Publication-4 describes logistics as “the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.” This covers the aspects of military operations which deal with: design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel; transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition or furnishing of services; and medical and health service support.(1)
A bit of history
Contrary to popular belief, Napoleon never said that “an army marches on its stomach,” but he is believed to have said that “one does not talk about supplies” (“on ne parle pas de vivres”). Nevertheless, the Napoleonic era can be seen as a turning point in thinking about the supply of armies precisely because of the fundamental changes in the way war was conducted. The introduction of general conscription led to an increase in scale in the field of warfare. Additionally, the Industrial Revolution brought about an exponential increase in production capacity and, with it, the resources needed to wage war.
That is not to say that the supply and sustainment of troops were not an issue before 1800. Alexander the Great already sent intendants ahead to buy supplies in the countries he subsequently conquered. In the centuries that followed, good generals also organised the supply of their troops, especially where the soldiers could not meet their needs in an alternative way; think of cannons and cannonballs. But soldiers regularly had to rely on themselves or the services of camp followers to arrange weapons, equipment, and food. This often meant ‘living off the land’ or, less euphemistically, plundering the local population.
The industrialisation of warfare kept pace with the Industrial Revolution. The American Civil War was won by the industrial and economic power of the Northerners. Which, by the way, also applies mutatis mutandis to the First and Second World Wars. Without the economic power of the United States, they might not have had the outcome we know today.
The Second World War in particular led to logistical innovations that still have a major impact on today’s military and civilian logistics. This applies both to hardware, such as the standardised container, and more conceptual methods such as the practical use of Operations Research. Linear programming also emerged as a vital tool, which found extensive use in addressing complex wartime challenges, including transportation logistics, scheduling, and resource allocation.(2)
Generally speaking, wars aren’t won with logistics alone, but are certainly lost without adequate sustainment.
Military Logistics during the Cold War
During the Cold War the logistical lessons from the Second World War were developed into NATO’s logistical doctrines. The members of NATO implemented the American lessons and modern concepts within their logistics chains. Due to national industrial interests, cooperation in the field of equipment – and therefore in the field of logistics – remained limited.
Standardisation was (and is) widely professed within NATO, but in practice it encounters many objections. The ultimate step, ‘combined’ logistics, was never taken. Logistics was and is a national responsibility and cooperation remains limited to obvious and universal matters such as the use of each other’s fuel. The Central European Pipeline System can be considered one of the few successful forms of logistics cooperation.
For political and organisational reasons, the USSR “forgot” that its victory over Nazi Germany was made possible in large part by the American Lend en Lease Act. Assisting the Soviet war effort, American Lend-Lease eventually transferred over $11 billion dollars of goods to Soviet Russia—roughly the equivalent of $250 billion today. Shipments included 400.000 vehicles, 14.000 aircraft, 13.000 tanks, 8.000 tractors, 4.5 million tons of food, and 2.7 million tons of petroleum products, as well as millions of blankets, uniforms, boots, and 107.000 tons of cotton. Perhaps the most telling indication of the importance of American assistance came from the USSR’s own senior leadership. As early as 1943 at the Tehran Conference, Stalin reportedly said: “The most important things in this war are machines. … The United States is a country of machines. Without the machines we received through lend-lease, we would have lost the war.” (3)
The selective Russian memory may be the reason that Russian supply logistics are still largely based on pre-World War II concepts. As a result, supply chains rely heavily on the railway network and the Russian army has a permanent shortage of trucks, low-loaders and material handling equipment.
The black sea area and specific (logistic) challenges
Economically the Black Sea has been an important factor for at least three millennia, however, and “often wars are caused by one country’s wish to take control of another country’s wealth. Whatever the other reasons for a war may be, there is very often an economic motive underlying most conflicts, even if the stated aim of the war is presented to the public as something more noble.” (4)
“Connected to the Mediterranean through the straits, the Black Sea constitutes a convenient route to the West, as it serves as a crossroads between Europe, Asia and Africa. The majority of long-distance trade bridges the Black Sea, giving commercial prosperity to the ports around it.” (5)
The Black Sea was an important part of the Silk Road before the start of the common era. It connected the Roman Empire with Asia. The sea served as a bridge for the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and it has been a trade route, migration route, and war route. With the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of Russia as a great power in the 18th century, the importance of the Black Sea as a trade route reemerged. The 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century were characterised by unsuccessful Russian attempts to control the trade routes across the Black Sea and the passage to the Mediterranean.
Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Black Sea was mainly of economic importance due to the transport of agricultural products, especially grain and cooking oil, from Ukraine. After the invasion of Ukraine, the Black Sea has also been given a renewed role as an alternative New Silk Road, the Middle Corridor (MC). This is a multimodal transport corridor connecting China to Europe with numerous border crossings, transshipments between modes and operational inefficiencies, that takes three times longer than the Northern New Silk Road via Russia. As a result, the MC has consequently held a lower priority for long-distance trade. It has become a viable alternative however, due to the sanctions against Russia and the threat against shipping in the Red Sea. (6)
For further transport beyond the Black Sea, the Bosphorus in Turkey is essential. Romania can also play a key role in the transit to (Western) Europe. While the Danube would be suitable for cost-effective transport of containers into the European interior, low water levels often make it unfit for efficient shipping. The planned deepening and canalisation of the river is met with strong objections from the environmental movement.
Finally, the Black Sea has gained even more economic importance due to recent gas discoveries. These gas discoveries are of strategic importance to Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria because they contribute to their energy security and economic growth. However, these finds have broader implications for Europe, the Black Sea region, and the global energy market, and can fuel both cooperation and rivalry in the region.
“For Russia, the geostrategic factors of the Black Sea region have not changed since 1853, with NATO and the United States replacing individual European states as Russia’s main geopolitical competitors: Crimea is the military source, Turkey is the pivot, and the Turkish Straits are the strategic throughput; and the end goal is access to and military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean as a counterbalance to U.S. and NATO expansion eastward and its presence in the Aegean and Central Mediterranean.” (7)
Modern (Military) Logistics
Military logistics encompasses various domains, such as transportation, inventory management, maintenance, and medical support. The management of these domains is of course determined by the operational requirements of the combat and combat support units, but they are also interdependent. In addition, the logistics chain must also be responsive and flexible. Military operations often require rapid adaptations to changing circumstances. A supply chain approach makes it possible to seamlessly adapt to unforeseen situations, such as changes in tactics or extreme weather conditions.
Over the last 50 years, the sustainment of a military organisation has only become more complicated. Not only is there a wider variety of equipment, it has also become much more technologically complex, both mechanically and because of the use of information technology. National and European Union regulations require that acquisitions need to be tendered and are awarded to the lowest bidder. This in turn leads to an even greater diversity of equipment, which is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain logistically.
When acquiring capital military assets, long-term sustainment often receives insufficient attention. The procurement of tanks, ships, and aircraft is prestigious, but the purchase of the bolts and nuts needed throughout their lifecycle is not. Additionally, budgets are often overly optimistic, and funding allocated for maintenance is frequently squeezed to purchase more units of the weapon system.
We therefore argue for an integrated supply chain approach, in which the entire supply chain is considered, from raw materials, through trade and production, to sustainment, to final use in a military environment, including the recycling of used or obsolete items. This integrated approach is all the more important because the vast majority of essential rare minerals are owned or controlled by China.
This requires a different type of acquisition and tendering process, in which producers and governments enter into long-term relationships. This is advantageous for the armed forces because availability of supplies is guaranteed in the longer term. At the same time, it offers producers of military equipment the opportunity to bind scarce technical personnel and to write off investments over a longer period of time.
It also requires intensive and close cooperation between manufacturers and ministries of defence throughout the lifespan of the equipment. In a control tower, where producers, transporters and governments work together, production and transport can be accurately tailored to the needs and expected consumption. Agreements must be made regarding civilian or military use of scarce raw materials. At the end of life of the products, much more attention will have to be paid to the reuse of rare minerals and scarce materials.
The proposed integrated approach should also be applied to the medical chain. Agreements must be made at an early stage between governments, medical institutions and hospitals about the use of medical resources that are scarce even under peacetime conditions. In the case of vehicle maintenance, agreements must be made in advance about the use of scarce key capacities and the (co-)use of mechanical workshops.
Military mobility
The enemy’s best grenade is the one that never reaches the frontline. The supply chain approach outlined above makes little sense if military capabilities cannot be deployed in the right place at the right time. The deterrent effect of a defence organisation only works if the potential enemy is convinced that deadly force will, but above all can be deployed.
Military mobility is the ability of armed forces to move troops, equipment, and resources quickly and efficiently over various distances, both in- and outside national borders. It covers a wide range of activities, from physical means of transport to logistics planning, international cooperation and increasingly cyber defence. Military mobility is crucial for deterrence and the success of military operations.
The armed forces’ need for physical means of transport (trains, planes, and trucks) during peacetime is much smaller than during periods of escalating tension or war. Owning all these assets outright is unnecessary and economically unfeasible. In times of war, the higher demand for transport resources will need to be met by the civilian sector. This can be achieved through requisitioning, but since drivers are also required, it is preferable to have civilian transport companies provide logistical support. These companies could handle transport in a relatively benign environment, after which the military takes over for the final stage towards the front. Here too, it is essential to make agreements well in advance.
The importance of military mobility has been recognised by both the EU and NATO. The PESCO project ‘Military Mobility’ is a political-strategic platform for simplifying and standardising national cross-border military transport procedures. It allows for the rapid movement of military personnel and assets across the EU by road, rail, sea and air. In early 2024, the European Commission decided to fund additional military mobility projects to support the transport of troops and equipment on the Trans-European Transport Network. With a budget of €807 million, these projects will modernise the EU’s essential transport infrastructure to enable dual use for both civil and defence transport. (8)
Equally essential is the ‘Enablement of Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s Area of Responsibility’ required for NATO to be able to rapidly move forces into, within and from the AOR in all directions and to sustain them. The cooperation between the EU and NATO in this area is solid, as evidenced by the participation of non-EU members in the PESCO project mentioned above. A crucial role is also reserved for the Joint Support Enablement Command in Ulm, Germany, whose task is to ensure seamless, swift, and secure movements of NATO forces through European NATO states – “SACEUR’s Rear Area” – to a (potential) combat area during crisis or war.
Improving military mobility is possible without reaching consensus on the subject within NATO or the EU. Individual members can, independent from other nations, take organisational or infrastructural measures that improve military mobility within their area of responsibility. The reinforcement of roads and bridges is just one example of these measures and a number of countries have already done this.
However, when improving military mobility across national borders, the entire chain must be taken into account. Simplifying border crossing and customs procedures requires coordination between at least two nations. Initiatives have been developed that give substance to the strengthening of military mobility, tailored to regional requirements and differences. In the Black Sea region, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece have signed a deal to enable swift cross-border movement of troops and weapons to NATO’s eastern flank. Albania, Bulgaria, Italy and North Macedonia also signed an agreement to improve military mobility. The Three Seas Initiative (9), aimed at developing transport, energy and digital infrastructure connections on the EU’s North-South axis, can certainly contribute to strengthening military mobility on the Eastern side of Europe.
The role of the Danube deserves special attention; the river is suitable for the transport of military equipment from Western Europe. However, this transport route is not only unreliable due to insufficient water levels, it is also vulnerable, as evidenced by the Russian attacks on ships and ports in 2023.
Further North, the Netherlands, Germany and Poland are jointly taking measures to standardise military movements by establishing a corridor. In addition, military trains should be given priority over civilian ones where appropriate, and procedures at border crossings should be further simplified. Furthermore, the aim is to minimise rules for military convoys. Logistical support along the corridor will be developed, such as rest areas and fuel facilities, and the transport of extra-heavy and large military equipment will be considered.
Wrapping up
Wars are preferably won without fighting (10), but ultimately won on the battlefield. Without adequate logistic support, or if the battlefield cannot even be reached, the battle is lost before it is fought. Organising this logistic support and the associated military mobility is not just a purely military task or a task of the Ministry of Defence. It requires a Whole of Society approach, in which military personnel, civil servants, ministries, commercial enterprises, non-governmental organisations and the entire population work together to organise a credible deterrent and, in the ultimate case, defeat the enemy.
Endnotes
(1) Allied Joint Publication-4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics (Edition B Version 1), December 2018.
(2) Linear programming, Encyclopedia Brittanica, www.britannica.com/science/linear-programming-mathematics
(3) Lend-Lease to the Eastern Front, July 29, 2024, www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/lend-lease-eastern-front#:~:text=Without%20the%20machines%20we%20received,would%20then%20enable%20Soviet%20counteroffensives.
(4) The 8 Main Reasons for War, Paul Goodman, owlcation.com/social-sciences/The-Main-Reasons-For-War#:~:text=1.,control%20of%20another%20country’s%20wealth.
(5) Herlihy, P., 1986. Odessa. A History 1794-1914. U.S.A.: Harvard University Press.
(6)The Middle Trade and Transport Corridor, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, November 2023.
(7) The Geostrategic Importance of the Black Sea Region: A Brief History, Boris Toucas, February 2, 2017.
(8)European Commission supports various military mobility projects, Netherlands ministry of foreign affairs, ecer.minbuza.nl/-/europese-commissie-steunt-diverse-militaire-mobiliteitsprojecten.
(9)The Three Seas Initiative, www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/europe-center/the-three-seas-initiative/.
(10) “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” The Art of War, Sun Tszu, classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html.
